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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
One of the objectives of artificial intelligence systems is to match the achievements of
human intelligence. Human intelligence involves a great deal of reasoning with
uncertainty. Therefore, reasoning with uncertainty is an important problem in artificial
intelligence. This research work is an attempt to solve the problem of non-independence
of evidence in reasoning with uncertainty. This issue is critically important in some real
world applications, but it has not yet been fully solved.
In this chapter, we describe the problem of dependent evidence, its importance, prior
research on the subject, the goal of this work, and a summary of the remainder of the
thesis.
1.1.Problem to Be Investigated
The problem of handling dependent evidence for reasoning with uncertainty can be
stated as follows: find the most plausible conclusions from partial , not fully reliable, and
possibly conflicting evidence which might or might not depend upon each other. Pieces
of evidence are said to be partial when they can not be used for deducing conclusions.
For example, when physicians diagnose diseases for patients, they make judgments often
based on partial evidence (collected symptoms) because of time and cost limitations for
collecting all symptoms. Pieces of evidence are not fully reliable when there is no way to
determine, based only on the pieces themselves, whether or not these pieces are correct.
For instance, evidence from remote sensors would be considered as not fully reliable2
evidence since sensors and data transmission could fail occasionally. Pieces of evidence
are conflicting if they imply different answers for the same question. We could view,for
example, different responses to the same question from several experts as conflicting
evidence.
Dependent pieces of evidence are stochastically correlated. Examples of such
evidence include two observations based on the same or two overlapping data sets (i.e.,
there is a non-empty intersection of the data sets), opinions of experts based on the same
or overlapping observations, and different measurements of a quantity by anobserver
using one piece of equipment.In contrast, independent sources are those that are
completely unrelated. An example would be different measurements by different
observers on different pieces of equipment. Clearly, the dependence among pieces of
evidence is common phenomenon in the real word, and it must be considered when
reasoning with uncertainty.
The goal of this research is to find a general framework for handling dependent
evidence for reasoning with uncertainty. The general framework should provide the
leading uncertainty calculi with formal solutions to the non-independence problem. Two
leading uncertainty calculi are the Shafer Theory of Evidence [Shafer 1976] and the
Odds-likelihood-ratio formulation of Bayes Theory [Duda, Hart and Nilsson 1976].
More specifically,this research focuses on three aspects:
(1) representing dependencemethods for representing dependence among pieces of
evidence and methods for obtaining measurement of dependence based on the
representations,
(2) combining evidence from dependent sources - methods for combining two dependent
pieces of evidence to produce a composite effect, and
(3) pooling and merging dependent evidence - methods for pooling and merging a
sequence of dependent evidence to produce a composite effect.3
1.2.Importance of the Topic
To illustrate how humans reason with uncertainty, let us consider an example.
Example 1.1. (Nuclear power plant accident [Henrion 1986]). The first radio news
bulletin you hear on the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant reports that the
release of radioactive materials may have already killed a thousand people. Initially you
place small credence in this, but as you start to hear similar reports from other radio, TV
stations, and in the newspapers, you believe it more strongly. Two days later, you find
that the reports were all from the same wire-service report based on a single unconfirmed
telephone interview from Moscow. Consequently, you greatly reduce your degree of
belief.
This example illustrates how multiple, independent supporting evidence increases
the confirmation of a hypothesis, but the degree of confirmation is reduced if pieces of
evidence are correlated. Although it is common for humans to handle this kind of
correlation between pieces of evidence, none of the better known uncertainty reasoning
systems, expert systems, and expert system shells are actually capable ofdoing so.
Instead they each make various assumptions about the dependence among pieces of
evidence. For example, the expert systems PROSPECTOR, MYCIN, and the expert
system shell EMYCIN include assumptions that evidence is independent[Shortliffe
1974, Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984]. The systems using Fuzzy Set combination
operators assume that evidence is maximally correlated [Henrion 1986]. Amongthe
uncertainty reasoning systems, Pearl's Belief Networks, one of the most successful
approaches, employs the conditional independence assumption [Pear 1986].The
Qualitative Markov Tree approach, a generalization of Pearl's approach, assumes that all
bodies of evidence are independent [Shenoy and Shafer 1986]. The Support Logic4
Programming System makes both independence and maximum dependence assumptions
for different circumstances [Baldwin 1985]. A hybrid approach which combines
symbolic approaches with numeric ones uses a default independence assumption
[D'Ambrosio 1987].
It is still not clear for what real world applications these assumptions could easily
hold and to which these approaches could be applied. What is clear is that there are many
circumstances in the real world in which these assumptions do not hold, and therefore
these approaches might not be applicable. The following are some examples.
Example 1.2. (Multi-expert systems [Morris 1986]).Combining opinions from
experts is a basic problem in decision making processes and a problem of broad interest
[Genest and Zidek 1986]. Since experts might share overlapping data, their opinions are
not completely independent in general. In fact, the problem of non-independence among
experts is critically important for building multi-expert systems. Morris claims:
"The issue of non-independence among experts is critically important because it
significantly affects the amount of uncertainty that one associates with the group. It is the
single most important issue in practical applications. Yet, it is often ignored in many
expert combination formulas, probably because it is extremely difficult to think about,
much less quantify."
Example 1.3. (Electronics troubleshooting [Cantone 1983]). In an effort to develope
an expert system for guiding a novice technician through each step of anelectronics
troubleshooting session, it has been found that test results (treated as evidential sources)
are not always independent because of circuit connectivity. For instance, there are some
test results that are taken from a common path in the circuitry under test.. To avoid the
non-independence problem, the system makes a maximum dependence assumptionif
two test results are not independent, one of them is simply ignored. This maximum
dependence assumption does not hold if more than one fault occurs in the circuit under5
test.
Example 1.4. (Military command and control [Rauch 1984]). In the modern military
environment, data fusion from different sources is becoming increasingly important.
Multiple sensor inputs need to be interpreted to assess developing battlefield conditions.
Again, one of the difficulties for this task is the non-independence problem. Multiple
sensors could provide correlated data which could not be treated by the better known
uncertainty reasoning approaches [Rauch 1984].
Example 1.5. (Design evaluator [Baldwin 1985]). Figure 1. shows an inference trace
for a design evaluator of the Support Logic Programming System (SLPS) which
determines if a design is acceptable or not.
Figure 1. An inference trace for a design evaluator
Given pieces of evidence that support terminal nodes with certain beliefs, the SLPS
computes four support beliefs for the proposition "design ok" from four paths and then6
combines the four beliefs to obtain an overall belief on the proposition. Notice that the
four beliefs from the four paths are not independent because "cost expensive" and
"performance good" are correlated, as are "cost expensive" and "looks modern".
Therefore, independence assumptions do not hold for this example.Ignoring the
dependence, however, SLPS treats the evidential sources as independent and produces
incorrect results.
These examples illustrate that there are indeed some circumstances in which
independence assumptions do not hold, and therefore the well known approaches for
reasoning with uncertainty can not be used. Thus it is necessary to develop approaches
for reasoning with dependent evidence if we believe that the above real world tasks (and
many others) are in application domains of AI.
1.3.Prior Research on the Topic
Uncertainty reasoning systems and expert systems fail to handle dependent
evidential sources because most of the uncertainty calculi developed so far do not support
the representation and combination of evidence from dependent sources. For instance,
the Dempster-Shafer Theory [Dempster 1967, Shafer 1976] can not represent and
combine dependent evidence directly. Neither can the MYCIN' CF model [Buchanan
and Shortliffe, 1984]. The combination operators of Fuzzy Set Theories [Zadeh 1965]
include the assumption of the maximum possible correlation between input propositions
[Cheeseman 1986, Haack 1979, and Henrion 1986].
Shafer proposes an approach to the non-independence problem for the Dempster-
Shafer Theory [Shafer 1984, Shafer 1987]. The basic idea is to reconstruct (reframe)
the frame of discernment such that all items of evidence are independent with respect to
the new frame of discernment. Shafer argues that in practice it is always possible to find
common uncertainties affecting the assessment of two items of evidence. If we bring the7
important common uncertainties explicitly into the frame of discernment, then it may be
reasonable to treat the remaining uncertainties as independent with respect to that frame.
While the approach does work for Shafer's examples, it has some disadvantages. As
Shafer himself noticed, the need for relatively simple frames is especially acute because
initial frames are often already so complex that it is impractical to refine them to make
common uncertainties explicit. And the need for formal insight into proper framing is
especially acute because such framing must be engineered before observational evidence
is obtained [Shafer 1984].
Hummel and Manevitz [1987] propose a model for parameterizing the degree of
dependence between bodies of evidence, and extend the Dempster-Shafer Theory for
combining evidence from dependent sources. The degrees of dependence between two
pieces of evidence are defined by joint probabilities. A drawback of this representation
is that the joint probabilities are often hard to obtain [Hummel and Manevitz 1987]. As a
result, subjective estimates of dependence are needed. But probably this is even harder
since it is not clear how human can learn such complex estimates. Another drawback of
this approach is that its combining rule is neither commutative nor associative, which
means that the results of combination are sensitive to the order in which evidence is
gathered [Hummel and Manevitz 1987]. This property is clearly not desired. For
example, should a physician give different diagnoses when he observes symptoms of a
patient in different orders?
In an attempt to develop expert systems for data fusion in military command and
control, Rauch [Rauch 1984] develops probability concepts which treat correlated data,
multiple reports and propagation of confidence limits through a hierarchy of production
rules. In this approach, the dependence parameters are explicitly represented as real
numbers (between -1 and 1). Unfortunately, the procedures for combining dependent
bodies of evidence are ad hoc. Although Rauch claims that the ad hoc procedures lead
to reasonable practical solutions the claim is not justified in his paper.8
Another interesting approach [D'Ambrosio 1987] treats the non-independence
problem in different way. The mechanisms of the ATMS [de kleer 1986] are used to
remember all of the support information for every proposition of interest. For example,
suppose that proposition P1 is supported by F1 and F2, and P2 is supported by F2 and
F3. If P3 is implied by P1 or P2 then P3 inherits all support information sources of P1
and P2, which are, in our example, F1, F2 and F3. Notice that P1 and P2 are dependent
since they share information source F2. Thus the belief of P3 can not be computed from
the beliefs of P1 and P2 by conventional methods. However, if we assume that F1, F2
and F3 are independent (default independence assumption), the belief of P3 can be
computed from F1, F2, and F3 since these items of support information have been
remembered together with P3. Therefore, under the default independence assumption,
the approach does treat dependent propositions correctly. However, if the assumption is
violated (e.g., see Example 1.5), correct results might not be produced.
While most uncertainty reasoning calculi in reasoning with uncertainty can not deal
with non independent sources of evidence, one could use traditional probabilities at least
in theory. For example, dependence could be represented by the probabilities for each
proposition conditional on all propositions on which it depends [Henrion 1986]. This
approach involves estimating many conditional probabilities. Here the question might be
whether humans can assess such conditional probabilities. Furthermore, it has been
argued that traditional probabilities require too much information that may not be available
in practice and that the approach lacks the ability to handle "ignorance" [Carnap 1950,
Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984, and Bhatnagar and Kanal 1986].
As we see above, the current techniques for handling dependent evidence are either
ad hoc, or too complex, or introduce other assumptions about dependence that does not
always hold. Thus, new techniques are indeed needed.9
1.4. Summary of Each Chapter
This thesis describes a general framework for handling dependent evidence. This
framework can be used with the most popular uncertainty calculi such as the Shafer
Theory of Evidence and the odds-likelihood-ratio formulation of Bayes Theory. The next
chapter briefly reviews these two uncertainty calculi, providing the background for the
remainder of the thesis.
In Chapter 3, we define the dependence parameter, a numerical representation of
dependencies among bodies of evidence. We discuss the meaning of dependence
parameters, provide an inside view into them that can be used to help producesubjective
estimates of the parameters, and develop methods for computing dependence parameters
from statistical information.
In Chapter 4, we describe a fundamental approach for combining two pieces of
evidence that might depend upon each other -- the Decomposition-Combination approach.
We then show how this approach can be used to combine dependent evidence represented
as belief functions or odds-likelihood-ratios. Thus, this approachprovides a formal
solution to the non-independence problem for the Shafer Theory of Evidence, and a new
model for dealing with dependent evidence for the Bayes family of methods.
In Chapter 5, we describe two algorithms that employ the Decomposition-
Combination approach.One algorithm is for pooling evidence and the other is for
merging evidence. The problem of pooling evidence is: as a sequence of evidence is
being gathered, the evidence is accumulatively combined into a single body of evidence to
obtain a composite effect. Merging evidence, instead of accumulatively combining,
combines entire sequences at once.The complexity and other properties of the
algorithms are also discussed.
Chapter 6 describes an experiment in the Decomposition-Combination approach.10
This experiment in soybean disease diagnosis is designed to demonstrate the
Decomposition-CombinatiOn approach is statistically applicable and works correctly for
real problems. The applicability of the approach is demonstrated by actually extracting
statistical information from real data about soybean diseases, and then applying it to this
information to produce diagnosis. The correctness of the diagnosis is justified by a "gold
standard", the diagnosis produced by a standard probability model. In the experiment,
the results produced by the Decomposition-Combination approach do match the "gold
standard".
In Chapter 7, we propose a potential application of one framework for handling
dependent evidence, an automatic decision maker of multi-expert systems. Because
experts often share data sources, the dependence among opinions of experts are
unavoidable. In fact, the issue of non-independence of experts has been recognized as a
critically important problem for decision making. While we do not exhaust every detail
of the automatic decision maker, we do discuss how the new framework for handling
dependent evidence can be used by the decision maker to reach a consensus solution
from several experts.
Finally, in Chapter 8 we summarize the main results of the research by highlighting
contributions to knowledge, assumptions and limitations. We also suggest directions for
further research work.11
CHAPTER 2. THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY
AND THE ODDS-LIKELIHOOD-RATIO FORMULATION
The Dempster-Shafer Theory (D-S Theory) [Shafer, 1976] and the Odds-likelihood-
ratio formation of Bayes Theory [Duda, Hart, and Nilsson 76] are two leading calculi for
combining evidence. They have been used in many systems which deal with uncertain
information such as Pearl's belief networks [Pearl 1986] and Shafer's Markov Trees
[Shanoy&Shafer 1987].In this chapter, we briefly review these two calculi. The
examples we use in this chapter are originally from Gordon and Shortliffe [1985].
Suppose that propositions h1, h2, ,hn are all possible actual answers to a
question of interest.The set H = h2, ,hn },is called the frame of
discernment; each hi is a singleton hypothesis. The elements of H are to be
mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The power set of the frame of discernment H,
denoted by 2H, is a hypothesis space with respect to H, which is a set of all possible
answers to the question. A non-singleton hypothesis, a subset of H with more than
one member, should be interpreted as the hypothesis that one of the singletons in it is the
correct answer to the question.
Example 2.1. Suppose a physician is considering a case of cholestatic jaundice. This
problem is caused by an inability of the liver to excrete bile normally. In a typical case of
this type, the diagnostic hypothesis set might include hepatitis (Hep), cirrhosis (Cirr),
Gallstones (Gall), and Pancreatic cancer (Pan). In terms of D-S theory, the set {Hep,
Cirr, Gall, Pan } is the frame of discernment H. The hypothesis space is the power set of
the frame of discernment:0, (Hep), { Cirr) ,(Gall), (Pan), (Hep Cirr), (Hep,
Gall), alep, Pan),Cirr, Gall), (Cirr Pan), {Gall, Pan), Cirr, Gall), (Hep,
Cirr, Pan), {Hep, Gall, Pan), {Cirr, Gall, Pan), H). The hypothesis space is the set of12
all possible hypotheses.
The D-S theory uses a number m(A) in the range [0,1] inclusive to indicate belief in
the hypothesis A. This number is a measure of that portion of the total belief committed
exactly to the hypothesis A. Thus the belief concerning the frame of discernment H can
be represented as a function m: 2H-->[0,1].This function m is called a basic
probability assignment (bpa) that must satisfy m(0) = 0 and Im(A) = 1. A focal
element F of a bpa m is a hypothesis F that satisfies m(F) > 0. Note that m(H) is a
measure of the extent to which we can make no decision at all regarding any of the
hypotheses; m(H) is a measure of our ignorance about the problem.
Example 2.2.Let H be (Hep, Cirr, Gall, Pan). Suppose a physician P observes
some symptoms from a patient and he decides that these symptoms support the diagnosis
of {Hep, Cirr} to the degree 0.6, but do not support a choice between cirrhosis and
hepatitis. The remaining belief, 1- 0.6 = 0.4, denotes the degreeof belief at which P has
not gathered any evidence that could be used to assign to any hypothesis in2H. The
unknown degree 0.4 is assigned to the frame H. Thus mi({Hep, Cirr)) = 0.6, mi(H) =-
0.4, and the value of m1 for every other hypothesis in 2H is 0.
Given several bpas over the same frame of discernment but based on distinct
independent pieces of evidence, Dempster's rule of combination [Dempster 1967]
enables us to compute a new bpa which is a composite of the original bpas. Suppose ml,
with focal elements A1, ,Ak, and m2, with focal elements B1, ,Bm, are bpas
over the same frame H. The new bpa is defined by m(0) = 0, and
1(An BiK 1111(Ai) *m2(B)
m(C) (2.1)
1E(Ain B) =oml(Ai)*m2(B)13
for all non-empty C in 2/1. This combination rule can be repeatedly applied to any
number of bpas and the final combined result does not depend on the order in which the
combination is done ( [Shafer, 1976]).
Example 2.3.Suppose physician P observes different symptoms from the same
patient as that in Example 2.2. These symptoms lead her/him (independently) to a
diagnosis of (Cir, Gall, Pan) with degree 0.7.Thus m2([ Cir, Gall, Pan)) = 0.7,
m2(H) = 1-0.7 = 0.3, and the other values of m2 are 0. Combining m2 with m1, from
Example 2.2, using (2.1), we obtain a new bpa m3:
m3({Cirr}) = 0.42, m3( {Hep, Cirr}) = 0.18,
m3({Cirr, Gall, Pan}) = 0.28, and m3(H) = 0.12.
Notice that the bpa m3 assigns the highest degree to the hypothesis {Cirr }. This seems
reasonable, since both diagnoses agree that Cirr might be the correct diagnosis.
The odds-likelihood-ratio formulation of Bayes Theory states that
0(HIE) = XE * 0(H) (2.2)
where H is a hypothesis, E is a body of evidence, 0(H) are prior odds, defined as
P(H)/P(H), XE is a likelihood ratio, defined as P(EIH)/P(EIH), and O(HIE) are the
posterior adds. E can be a set of evidence { E1,...,Ern}.If all pieces of evidence are
independent of each other, XE can be determined by
XE = XE1 * XE2 *-..* XEm- (2.3)14
The underlying probability P(HIE) can be recovered from odds by the simple formula
P(HIE) = O(HIE) / (0(HIE)+1). (2.4)
These two uncertainty calculi have been extensively studied and have been used in
many expert systems and uncertainty reasoning systems even though they lack of the
ability to deal with dependent evidence. Since independent evidence can be processed by
these two calculi, a more efficient way to deal with dependent evidence could be to
transfer the problem with dependent evidence into an equivalent problem with
independent evidence such that these two successful calculi could be still used. This is
the philosophy underlying our research on the non-independence problem.15
CHAPTER 3. REPRESENTING DEGREES OF DEPENDENCE
In this chapter, we define the dependence parameters that represent explicitly
dependence among pieces of evidence. The dependence parameters weight the portions
of evidential sources that are shared by multiple pieces of evidence, providing a view into
the dependence which can be used to help model subjective estimates of the parameters.
We develop two methods for computing the dependence parameters from statistical data
for two different uncertainty calculi, the Shafer Theory of Evidence (or the D-S Theory)
and the Odds-likelihood-ratio formulation of Bayes Theory. We also discuss how
dependence parameters can be organized into matrices, and how the matrices can be
normalized to reveal overlapping relationships among pieces of evidence. In Chapter 5,
we will see these normalized dependence matrices can be used to combine sequences of
dependent evidence.
3.1.Defining Dependence Parameters
In order to represent dependence between bodies of evidence, we introduce
dependence parameters which take values between 0 and 1. The value 0 of a parameter
means that the bodies of evidence are independent of each other. Larger dependence
values indicate that bodies of evidence depend more strongly upon each other. When the
parameters reach the value one, the bodies of evidence are maximally dependent, which is
equivalent to logic implication.
At the very beginning stage of the research, we tried to model the dependence
paremater in term of probabilities. For example, we tried to use conditional probabilities,
covarience, and correlation parameters to define the dependence parameter. But we
found that it was very hard to define the dependence parameter such that the definition16
was conceptually simple and intutive if we only used those probability concepts. It is
generally recognized that the concepts of covarience and correlation parameters defined in
probabilities are conceptually hard. We emphasize the conceptual simplicity of the
definition because the simpler the definition is, the easier the dependence parameters can
be assessed by people. Therefore, we switched to the concept of weight of evidence,
which is described later in this section.
To illustrate the meaning of the dependence parameters, let us consider two
examples.
Example 3.1. Suppose that we want to combine opinions of two physicians P1 and
P2 who make diagnoses on a patient. P1 observes four symptoms si, s2, s3, and s4
and diagnose the illness as El with certain degree of belief, while P2 observes three
symptoms s3, s4, and s5, and diagnoses the illness as E2 with another degree of belief.
The ultimate objective here would be consider El and E2 as evidence to produce a
diagnosis that represents a composite of the diagnoses by P1 and P2. Notice that El and
E2 are not independent at all, since they share symptoms s3 and s4. Thus, we could say
that El and E2 are not independent because they overlap. If we could somehow estimate
the weight each symptom contributes to the diagnosis, then we could estimate the weight
of the overlap (s3 and s4) which could be used to represent how strongly El and E2
depend upon each other.
Example 3.2. Suppose the objective is to develop a system that provides expert help in
purchasing PCs. Let El be the body of evidence "the IBM PC/AT is expensive" and E2
be "the quality of the IBM PC/AT is high".Intuitively, "expensive" is generally
dependent on "high quality" though they are not equivalent. Therefore, we could expect
E1 and E2 to be stochastically correlated. Unlike El and E2 of Example 3.1, E1 and E2
here do not explicitly share common information. However, if we further analyze El and17
E2, we could find something that actually correlates them. For example, we could
decompose E1 into E11 and E12, and E2 into E21 and E22 in the following way:
E11: the costs that do not contribute to the high quality are high;
E12: the manufacturing costs that lead to the high quality is high;
E21: the quality that is gained from high manufacturing costs is high; and
E22: the quality that is gained from the factors other than high cost is high.
In this decomposition, E12 and E21 seem to say the same thing, since both of them
uniquely represent the relationship between "expensive" and "high quality". Thus E12
and E21 could be viewed as a single body of evidence which is shared by E1 and E2.
Again, if we could estimate the weight of this shared piece of evidence, then this weight
could be used to denote how strongly E1 and E2 are correlated.
These examples illustrate that the explicit or implicit overlap of evidence plays an
important role in analyzing the dependence. From this point of view, we now proceed to
define the dependence parameters that quantify the dependence. Let El, E2, El', E2',
and E be propositions (evidence) such that E1 is a composite of E1' and E; and E2 is a
composite of E2' and E. The evidence E, then, is the part we have been calling the
"overlap".It would be symptoms s3 and s4 for Example 3.1 and E12 (or E21) for
Example 3.2. Let w1, w2, ww2', and w be the weights for E1, E2, El', E2', and E
respectively. Recall that a weight of evidence is a positive measure of how strongly, in
comparison with the other evidence, the evidence supports the hypothesis [Shafer,
1976]. We shall discuss the mathematical meanings of weights with respect to belief
functions and odds-likelihood-ratio of Bayes later in this chapter.
Definition 3.1. The dependence parameters between E1 and E2, denoted by
D1,2, which indicates how strongly E1 depends upon E2, and D2,1, which indicates
how strongly E2 depends upon E1, are defined as D1,2 = w / W1, and D2,1 = w / w2.18
According to the addition law of weights of evidence [Shafer 1976], we have
D1,2 = w / (w 1' + w), and D2,1 = w / (w2' + w).
Thus, the following are true:
1. 0 _131,2, D2,11,
2. D1,2 = 0 iff D2,1 = 0 iff El and E2 are independent,
3. D1,2 = 1 iff El logically implies E2 and D2,1 =1 iff E2 logically implies El, and
4. D1,2 = D2,1 = 1 iff El and E2 are logically equivalent.
From these facts, we can see that the definition of dependence parameters achieves the
intuitive appeal mentioned at the beginning of this section. Dependence parameters take
values between 0 and 1. The value 0 of a parameter means that the bodies of evidence are
independent of each other. The larger the dependence parameters are, the more strongly
the bodies of evidence depend upon each other. When the parameters reach the value
one, the bodies of evidence are maximally dependent, which is equivalent tologic
implication.
Example 3.3. If we assume that each symptom in Example 3.1 equally supports the
diagnosis (this assumption could be relaxed if physicians provide us with the data to
distinguish between the strengths of symptoms), we can infer that D1,2 = 1/2 and D2,1 =
2/3 for evidence El and E2 of Example 2.1. For El and E2 of Example 3.2, we could
assume that the cost of a IBM PC/AT is dominated mainly by its high quality since the
current economic situation is fairly stable. Thus we could subjectively judge D1,2 =
D2,1= 2/3. Rather than a precise mathematical computation, this judgementis simply a
subjective estimate, although it could be guided by looking into the meanings of
decomposition of evidence. In the next section, we discuss how to compute "objective"
dependence parameters from statistical data.19
3.2.Statistical Dependence Parameters
If statistical information about evidence is available, we would hope that dependence
parameters could be determined from the information instead from subjective estimation.
The "objective" dependence parameters constructed from statistical data would be more
precise and more reliable than subjective judgements, although it is sometime hard to find
such statistical information in some domains of AI applications. In this section, we
deduce methods for computing such "objective" dependence parameters, one for the
Shafer Theory of Evidence and another for the Odds-likelihood-ratio formulation of
Bayes Theory. These methods can be used directly to decompose dependent evidence
into independent pieces, even if we do not explicitly compute the dependence parameters.
1 1 11 1 11
A statistical specification in the Shafer Theory of Evidence is defined as [Shafer
1976]
H, X, {clh}heH
where H is the set of all possible answers to the question of interest; X is a set of all
possible outcomes of an experiment that is related to H, and qh (x)(x E X) is a
conditional chance density.In order to handle dependent evidence, we extend the
statistical specification by adding a class of conditional covariance:
Covh(xi, xj) }he H.
Here we treat all x E X as binary random variables taking values 0 or 1. Every x in X
corresponds to a body of evidence. If the evidence occurs, x takes value 1; otherwise x
has value 0. Since xi and xj might depend on each other, we can imagine again that they20
share a underlying evidential source, xij. Furthermore, we can represent xi and xi by xij:
xi = xi' v xij, and xi = xi v xij
where xi,xi', and xij are binary random variables denoting distinct pieces of evidence.
This representation simply means that evidence xi can be viewed as a disjunction of two
smaller pieces of evidence, xi' and xij, where xi is distinct from xj, and xij is shared by
xj. The first step towards the "objective" dependence parameter is to compute the chance
density of the shared piece xij:
{(1h(xij)}he H.
Given statistics on xi and xj, we can actually compute the chance density by solving the
system of equations developed in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1.Suppose that xi = xi' v xij, xi = xi' v xij, and that xi', xi', and xij are
independent binary random variables. The following hold for all h E H:
qh2(xii)qh(xii) + B * Covh(xi, xj) = 0,
clh(xi) = clh(xi)clh(xij)clh(xi) * clh(4),
clh(xj) = clh(q)qh(xij)clh(q) * clh(xij),
where B= 1/(1-(qh(xi')+qh(xp-qh(xi')*qh(xi') ))
Proof.We start with the fact that
Covh(xi, xj) = EXPh(xi*xj) - EXPh(xi) * EXPh(xj)
where EXPh(x) is the conditional expectation of x given that h is true. For any binary
random variable x, we can replace EXPh(x) with the conditional chance qh(x).
Therefore, we have
Covh(xi, xj) = qh(xi*xj) - qh(xi) * qh(xj)21
Replacing xi with (xi v xij) and xi with (xj' v xij), we have
Covh(xi, xj) = qh( (xi'vxii) A (xj'vxij) ) - qh(xi'vxii) * qh(xi'vxij)
A lengthy but straightforward algebraic exercise involving distributing "A" in this
equation yields the first equation of the theorem. The other two equations are simply the
addition law of probabilities.
End of proof
With the chance density of xij, we can compute belief functions Bxi, Bxj, and Bxij
supported by xi, xj, and xij from chance densities [ qh(xi)}he H, { gh(xj)} he H, and
{qh(xii)} he H, which in turn can be used to compute the weights of evidence wi, wj, and
wij [Shafer 76]. Finally, the dependence parameters can be computed by Definition3.1.
I l'h!11-r.i
In order compute "objective" dependence parameters for the odds-likelihood-ratio
formulation of Bayes Theory, we must first develop the association between the weight
of evidence W and the likelihood-ratio XE supported by evidence E. Shafer develops a
weight-belief association for the Shafer Theory of Evidence by requiring that the
combination of two degrees of support should correspond to addition of the weights of
these two degrees of support [Shafer 76]. We use the same requirement to develop the
weight-belief association for odds-likelihood-ratio. We restrict the discussion to
situations in which evidence E and hypothesis H are positively correlated, that is, P(H) 5
P(HIE). Later in Chapter 8, we will discuss this positive correlation assumption.
Let E1 = Ei 'A E, and wi,w1', and w be the weights of El , El ', and E
respectively. To establish the association between weights and likelihood ratio, we need
find a function g: [-00, 00] -> (0, 00] such thatwlwliw,
g(w= XE 1',
g(w) = XE, and
g(w1) 21-E1 *
From the requirements, we have
gwi) = g(w 1') * g(w).
The function g satisfying the above conditions can be defined as
g(WEi)XE1 = ewEl (3.1)
Let g-1: (0,.] --> [-., .] be the inverse function of g. It follows immediately that
g- 1 (XE )E1 = In(XE1). (3.2)
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Let Ei=(E ' AND E) and E2=(E2' AND E), and wi, w2 and w be the weights of
E1, E2 and E. Assume El', E2,and E are independent of each other. Remember our
goal is to compute "objective" dependence parameters from statistical information of
evidence. We have known how to compute weights wi, w2, and w from likelihood-
ratio X,Ei, XE2, and X,E. But, how can we obtain these likelihood-ratios? 2k,E1 andXE2
can be computed simply by the defmition
= P(EilH)/ P( -EilH) and 42 = P(E2 IH) / P(E2 IH) (3.3)
since the conditional probabilities can be obtained from statistical data. XE is not that
easy to compute because E is a piece of underlying shared evidence which might not be
obtainable from statistical data. The following theorem tells us how to compute the
conditional probabilities P(EIH) and P(EIH) which can then be used to compute XE.23
Theorem 3.2. Let CovH(Ei, E2) be the conditional covariance of E1 and E2 given H
= true. Then we have:
(1) CovH(Ei, E2) = P(E1'IH) * P(E2'IH) * [ P(EIH)P2(EIH)],
(2) P(E1IH) = P(EillH) * P(EIH), and
(3) P(E2IH) = P(E2'IH) * P(EIH).
Proof.This proof is very similar to that of Theorem 3.1. We start with the fact that
CovH(Ei, E2) = EXPH(Ei * E2) - EXPH(E1) * EXPH(E2)
where EXPH(X) is the conditional expectation of random variable X, and CovH(Ei, E2)
is the conditional covariance of E1 and E2. For any binary random variable X, we can
replace EXPH(X) with the probability P(XIH). Therefore, we have
CovH(Ei, E2) = P(Ei AND E2 I H) - P(EilH) * P(E2IH).
Replacing E1 with E1' AND E, and E2 with E2' AND E, we obtain
CovH(Ei, E2) = P(Ei'lH) * P(E 1H) * P(EIH) - P(E11111) * P(E2IH) * P2(EIH),
which is the first equation in the theorem. The second and the third equations are simply
the multiplication law for independent random variables. End of Proof
Notice that these three equations form a system of equations that allows us to
compute P(EIH) from CovH(Ei, E2), P(E1IH), and P(E2IH). Similarly, we can compute
P( -EIH) from CovH(-El, -E2), P(- E1IH), and P(-E2IH).
In summary, we can obtain the "objective" dependence parameters by computing:
(1) P(Ei IH), P(E2IH), P(-EilH), P(-E2IH), CovH(Ei, E2), and CovH(-E1, -E2)
from statistical data,
(2) 2 E1 and XE2 by (3.3),
(3) P(EIH) and P(-EIH) by Theorem 3.2,
(4) ?LE = P(EIH) / P(-EIH),24
(5) weights wi, w2, and w by (3.2), and
(6) the statistical dependence parameters D1,2 and D2,1 by Definition 3.1.
3.3.Dependence Matrices
In this section, we will make a pairwise dependence assumption that only two pieces
of evidence are involved in each pairwise dependence. We will also introduce the
concept of matrix normalization. Normalized matrices are used for pooling and merging
sequences of evidence, which is discussed in Chapter 5.
An n by n dependency matrix is defined as
[Di,j]n(1 5.jn, ij)
where Di,j is the dependence parameter of the ith body of evidence on the jth. The
entries on the main diagonal are ignored. We assume that the weights from which the
dependence parameters are computed are positive integers.
Dependence parameters Di,i and Dj,i are said to be numerator-normalized if their
numerators are equal. For example, let Di,j = 1/2 and Di,i = 2/3. Di,j and Dj,i can be
numerator-normalized as Di,i = 2/4 and Di,i = 2/3. The numerator 2 is the number of
weight units of the portion shared by Ei and Ei while denominators 4 and 3 are the total
numbers of weight units possessed by Ei and Ei respectively. Figure 2. shows that
numerator-normalized dependence parameters reveal the overlapping of evidence Ei and
A single square in the figure presents one weight unit.25
Ej
Ei
Di,j = 2/4, Di,i= 2/3
Figure 2.Numerator-normalized
dependence parameters revealing the
overlapping of Ei, and
Ek Ej
Ei
Di,j = 3/6, Di,k = 2/6
Figure 3. Denominator-normalized
dependence parameters revealing the
overlapping of Ei, Ej and Ek.
Dependence parameters Di j and Di,k are said to be denominator-normalized if
their denominators are the same. For example, let Di = 1/2 and Di,k = 1/3. The
denominator-normalized Di j and Di,k should be 3/6 and 2/6 respectively. The
denominator 6 indicates the total number of weight units possessed by Ei while the
numerators 3 and 2 denote the numbers of weight units shared by Ej and Ek respectively.
The denominator-normalized parameters reveal the overlapping of evidence Ei, Ei, and
Ek, as shown in Figure 3.
A dependence matrix is said to be normalized if all entries in each row are
denominator-normalized and each pair Di, and Dbi is numerator-normalized. In other
words, in a normalized dependence matrix, all dependence parameters in each row have
the same denominator, and each pair of Di j and 13.bi has the same numerator. The
denominator in the ith row tells us how many weight units the ith piece of evidence has,
while the numerators in the ith row tell us how many weight units are shared with the
other pieces of evidence. Therefore, the normalized dependence matrix provides us with
an overall view of the overlapping of all the evidence involved.26
Example 3.4. Normalizing the matrix:
El E2 E3 E4
E1 1/30 1/6
E2 1/4 1/20
E3 0 1/3 1/6
E4
produces
1/40 1/2
El E2 E3
El 2/60 1/6
E2 2/8 4/80
E3 0 4/12 2/12
E4 1/40 2/4
E2
E4
El
)El
E3
E
E2
E3
E4
Figure 4. The layout of dependence among evidence El, E2, E3, and E4.
The normalized matrix shows the layout of dependence among evidence E1, E2, E3,
and E4. For example, the first piece of evidence El has the strength of six weight units27
among which there are two shared with E2 and one shared with E4. Figure 4 illustrates
the overlap among the four bodies of evidence.
Not all possible dependence matrices are normalizible. If values of dependence
parameters are inconsistent, the matrix might not be normalizible. The inconsistency
might be introduced by careless assessments of dependence parameters that are based on
"local views" rather than "global designs" of interrelationships among evidence. We
discuss the normalizability problem and a normalization algorithm in the following
section.
3.4.Normalizability and Normalization
This section presents a recursive algorithm that normalizes dependence matrices that
are normalizable and reports non-normalizibility of the matrices that are not normalizable.
We prove the correctness of the algorithm and briefly discuss its complexity. We would
like to emphasize that the issue of its complexity is not important for our purpose of
combining evidence. This is because a dependence matrix can be pre-normalized before
any actual combination starts. Therefore, the combination itself does not consume any
time for normalization.
The algorithm treats the dependence matrix to normalize as a global array DM. The
algorithm recursively calls itself with the parameter currentBound that indicates the
portion of DM the algorithm should work on. Starting normalizing the smallest portion
of DM, DM[1..2, 1..2] (with parameter currentBound=2), the algorithm gradually
extends the normalized portion of DM step by step until the entire array is normalized
(currentBound=n).28
Algorithm 3.1. normalize(currentBound)
Begin
1. if currentBound = 2
2. then numerator normalize the pairs of DM[1,2] and DM[2,1];
3. else
4.nonnalize(currentbound-1); i = currentBound;
5. for k=1 to currentBound-1 do
numerator normalize pairs of DM[k,i] and DM[i,k];
6. for k=1 to currentBound-1 do
7.LCD = the least common denominator of DM[k,i-1] and D[k,i];
8.modifier = LCD / denominator of DM[k,i-1];
9.if modifier > 1 then
10.Multiply all numerators and denominators in DM[1..i-1, 1..i-1] by modifier;
11.Multiply all numerators and denominators in DM[1..k-1, i] and DM[i,l..k-1]
by modifier
12.modifier = LCD / denominator of DM[k,i];
13.Multiply numerators and denominators of DM[k,i] and DM[i,k] by modifier;
14. if not (all the denominators of DM[i, 1..i-1] are the same)
15. then
16.print "the dependence matrix is NOT normalizible.";
17.exit;
End.
Theorem 3.3. Algorithm 3.1. correctly normalizes the dependence matrix DM if DM is
normalizible.
Proof (induction on currentBound) If currentBound equals to two, step 2 normalizes the
two by two array, which is clearly correct. Suppose that when currentBound equals to i-
1, Algorithm 3.1 correctly normalizes the array DM[1..i-1, 1..i-1]. This supposition is
implemented by step 4, a recursive call. Now, let us discuss the case of currentBound
i. We shall prove that the algorithm correctly normalizes array DM[1..i, 1..i]. That is,
the algorithm extends the normalized array DM[1..i-1, 1..i-1] by adding the ith row and
the ith column, as shown in Figure 5. This extension is achieved by steps 5 through 13
of the algorithm. Step 5 numerator-normalizes all newly added pairs of DM[k,i] and
DM[i,k]. Steps 6 through 13 denominator-normalize the array DM[1..i, 1..i] using the
fact that DM[1..i-1, 1..i-1] has been normalized. As the kth row is being denominator-
normalized, if its denominator must be changed, then the entire region that has been29
normalized must be correspondingly changed such that the region is still normalized after
the change. This is achieved by steps 10 and 11. Steps 12 and 13 numerator-normalize
DM[k,i] and DM[i,k]. Because the normalized portion of DM[1..i-1,1..i-1] is still
normalized; the newly added ith column is denominator-normalized with rows 1,..., i-1;
and the newly added ith row is numerator-normalized with the corresponding ith row,
DM[1..i,1.1] is normalized if the ith row is denominator-normalized.
End of Proof
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Figure 5. The dependence array DM being normalized.
To justify steps 14 through 16 of the algorithm, we can prove that a dependence
matrix is normalizible if and only if at each call to algorithm normalize, the ith row is
automatically denominator-normalized after step 13. We will not give the details of the
proof because this proof needs many formal notations that might confuse readers.30
However, we use an example to illustrate how the proof can be done.
If at each call to the algorithm, the ith row is automatically denominator-normalized,
then the entire region DM[1..i,l..i] is normalized (see the proof of Theorem 3.3). When
the algorithm returns from the top level call (currentBound=n), the whole array is
normalized. Therefore, the dependence matrix is normalizable (since it has already been
normalized). Now, we shall show that if there exists an i such that the ith row is NOT
automatically denominator-normalized after step 13, then the array is not normalizable.
To make the proof easier to understand, we use a simple example to illustrate the proof.
A proof for general situations is similar to the simple one. Suppose we use the algorithm
to try to normalize the dependence array shown in Figure 6 (a). After step 13 of the
second call to the algorithm, we have a partially normalized array shown in Figure 6 (b).
Notice that the third row is not automatically normalized by the algorithm. In Figure 6
(c), the constraints among numerators and denominators for a normalized array are
represented by lines that indicate the numbers at two ends of a line must be the same.
Look at the third row of Figure 6 (c). If we want to denominator-normalize the row (that
is, make all denominators in the row the same), we have to somehow increase the
denominator of DM[3,2] that is 12. This increase results in a propagation alone the
constraint lines through the whole array:Increasing 12 caused 9, the numerator of
DM[3,2], to increase,caused 9, numerator of DM[2,3], to increase, caused 15 to
increase, 10 to increase, 60 to increase, 15 to increase, and finally 30 that is the
denominator in the third row increase. Thus, any raising of a denominator at third row
must result in, through the constraint lines, the raising of the other denominators in the
same row at the same ratio. Therefore, there is no way to denominator-normalize the
third row. As a consequence, the array can not be normalized.31
1
6
1
4
2
3 5
1 3
24
10
60
15
60
10 9
15 15
159
3012
1015
60
9
1.) 15
19
3012
(a) Matrix to normalize (b) Partially normalized matrix (c) Constraints
Figure 6. An example of non-normalizability.
Therefore, Algorithm 3.1 can normalize any dependence matrix which is
normalizable, and can report non-normalizability of any dependence matrix that is not
normalizable. The following theorem tell us Algorithm 3.1 is a polynomial-time
algorithm.
Theorem 3.5. The time complexity of Algorithm 3.1 can be bounded by a polynomial.
Proof The complexity of steps 5 through 13 can be bounded by a polynomial P(k) of
order k. The complexity of the entire algorithm T(n) can be computed from
T(n) = T(n-1) + P(kn), n2
T(2) = P(k2).
The solution to this difference equation is a polynomial. End of Proof32
CHAPTER 4. COMBINING TWO BODIES OF DEPENDENT
EVIDENCE
This chapter describes a general framework for combining two pieces of dependent
evidence and discusses how the Dempster combination rule and the Odds-likelihood-ratio
formulation of Bayes Theory can be used in the framework to combine dependent
evidence.Some examples and data are given to illustrate the properties of the
combination framework.
4.1. A General Framework
The basic idea of this framework, shown in Figure 7, is to transfer the problem of
combining dependent evidence into a problem of combining independent ones. If we can
do so, we can use established combination rules for independent evidence, such as the
Dempster combination rule and the Odds-likelihood-ratio formulation of Bayes Theory.
The key to this framework is the decomposition of evidence. Given two bodies of
evidence E1 and E2 that might be dependent on each other, we would like to decompose
El into two pieces Eli and E12 in such a way that Eli is completely distinct from E2
and E12 is shared with E2. Similarly, E2 should be decomposed into E21 and E22 such
that E21 is shared with E1 and E22 is distinct from El. Thus, E12 or E21 is the shared
portion of El and E2, and they are based on the same evidential source, denoted by F.
Now we have three independent pieces of evidence, Eli, E', and E22 which can be
combined by a known combination rule for independent evidence). This combination
produces a composite effect of El and E2 and takes dependence into account.El
E=Combine(E1, E2)
Decompose
El and E2.
Combine Combine Ell,
E12 and E21. E', and E22.
Figure 7. A general framework for combining dependent evidence.
E
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Therefore, this general framework for combining dependent evidence is a four-step
procedure:
1. decomposing El into independent pieces Eli and E 12,
2. decomposing E2 into independent pieces E21 and E22,
3. determine E' from E12 and E21, and
4. combining Eli, E', and E22 by a combination rule for independent evidence.
In step 3, the belief supported by E' is simply that supported by E12 (or E21) if E12
= E21. This is the situation in which the judgements, or assignments of beliefs, from El
and E2 are consistent; that is, in which judging E' from the El point of view produces the
same level of belief as that produced by judging E' from the E2 point of view. Here we
can view beliefs in Eland E2 as expert judgements, belief in E12 is the judgement of one
expert on the shared portion of El and E2, and belief in E21is the judgement from the34
other expert on the shared portion of E1 and E2.
Sometimes expert assignments of beliefs might differ even when they are based on
the same evidential source. Such difference could result from very complex factors in
human nature such as the psychological or epistemic status, or social factors. Since it is
impossible to build a formal model for these kinds of factors at the current development
stage of AI, we treat differences of the judgements as noise. Thus the expert judgements
based on E could be assumed to be from a normal distribution on random variables
underlying E. This distribution would suggest that experts who used the exact same
evidence would tend towards the same judgements.Thus, a natural method for
determining the weight for E from E12 and E21 is to average the weights of E12 and
E21. An epistemic view of E is that it is simply a compromise between two different
expert judgements E12 and E21 which are based on the same evidential sources. This
view could also suggest an averaging approach for determining E'.
We will call this framework the Decompostion-Combination method (D-C
method) in the rest of the thesis. Since the decomposition of evidence plays a central role
in the D-C method, we now turn to a more detailed discussion of this aspect.
Definition 4.1. Given two bodies of evidence El and E2, the decomposition of
evidence that decomposes Ei into Ell and E12, and E2 into E21 and E22 is valid if it
satisfies
1. combining Eli with Ei2 by the combination rule produces El,
2. combining E21 with E22 by the combination rule produces E2,
3. Eli is completely distinct from E2, and E22 is completely distinct from El,
4. E21 is shared with El, and E12 is shared with E2.
Any calculus for numerically combining evidence can fit into this framework if and
only if a valid decomposition exists for that calculus. In the next section, we shall show
that valid decompositions exist for Dempster combination rule and for the Odds-35
likelihood-ratio formulation of Bayes Theory.
4.2.Decomposing Dependent Evidence for Theory of Evidence
We first develop a method for the decomposition of evidence for the Dempster
combination rule and then derive another for the Odds-likelihood-ratio formulation of
Bayes Theory. These two methods use dependence parameters to decompose evidence.
Let mi and m2 be two bpas with the same focal hypotheses. The goal of the
decomposition is to legally decompose mi into two bpas mil and mi2, and m2 into m21
and m22. The following theorem tell us how the goal can be achieved.
Theorem 4.1. The decomposition defined by
mll = 1(1mi)1/(ki+1),
m12 = 1(1m1)(11/(k1 +1)),
m22 = 1(1m2)1/(k2+1), and
m21 = 1(1m2)(11/(k2+1))
where k1n/(1-D1,2) and k2n = 1,2/ = 2,1/ (1-D2 ,1), is a valid decomposition for the
Dempster combination rule.
Proof.We construct the decomposition step by step, which shows that the resulting
decomposition is a legal one. Clearly, the foci of m11 and m12 must be the same as the
focus of m1 because the combination of m11 and m12 must yield m1. According to
Shafer [1976], the relationship between the weight of evidence w and the degree of
belief b supported by this evidence should be
w = - In (1-b).
Thus, lettingwll, W12 be the weights of Ell and E12respectively, we have
w 1 1 = ln(1- m11) (4.1)w 12 = - ln(1- m12)
(4.2)
w12 =K*w11
where K = D1,2 / (1-D1,2) by Definition 3.1. Thus we have
ml ok = m12).
Let V= 1 - m and 11 11
V121m12.
We obtain V1 1k= V12
(4.6)
Combining m11 with m12 by Dempster's rule (2.1), we have
m11+ m12 ml l*m12 = ml.
LetV1 = 1 - m1.
From (4.4), (4.5) and (4.7), we have
V11 *V12 = V1'
(4.3)
(4.4)
(4.5)
(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9)
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Solving (4.6) and (4.9), we obtain the first two equations in the theorem. Notice that the
resulting m11 and m12 satisfy (4.7). Therefore, combining them indeed yields ml. And
also notice that the definition of the dependence parameters D1,2 and D2,1 guarantees
that the decomposition satisfies the other two conditions of valid decomposition.
Decomposing E2 can be done in the same way. Thus we have proved the theorem.
End of Proof.
Example 4.1.This example illustrates that the decomposition defined in Theorem 4.1
is valid. Suppose that mi({a}) = 0.75, m2({a}) = 0.6, D1,2 = 1/2, and D2,1 = 1/3.
Applying Theorem 4.1 to m1 and m2, we obtain mi ({ a } ) = 0.5, m12({a}) = 0.5,37
m21({a}) = 0.263, and m22({a}) = 0.457.As a check, we use the Dempster
combination rule to combine mil with mi2, and m21 with m22.We discover that the
combinations indeed produce the original bpas mi and m2. Notice that the definition of
the dependence parameter guarantees that the decomposition satisfies the other two
properties of the valid decomposition. Thus, the decomposition is indeed valid.
Suppose bpa m has two mutually exclusive foci H1 and H2. This would be the case
in which, for example, the evidence carries the certainty of a hypothesis and of its
negation. This representation of evidence is proposed by Baldwin and used in Support
Logic Programming [Baldwin, 1985]. In such cases, we can first decompose m into
simple support functions min with unique focus H1 and mH2 with unique focus H2 such
that combining min with Trim produces m. This decomposition is a the canonical
decomposition [Shafer, 1976], which can be done by using the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Let m be a bpa with two foci H1 and H2, that is, m(H1) and m(H2) are
greater than 0. Let min be a bpa with a focus H1, and mH2 be a bpa with a focus H2.
The decomposition defined by
mH1= (k1-(k12- 4 *A*k2)-1/2)/(2*A),
= A * (1m(ll) / mill
where A = 1 / (1 - m(H1)),
B = 1 / (1 - m(H2)),
k1= A *m(H1)- B *m(H2) +A *B,and
k2 = m(il) * A * B,
satisfies that (1) it is unique, and (2) combining mil with mH2 produces m.
Proof.For uniqueness of the decomposition, see [Shafer, 1976]. We prove that
combining mHl with mH2 produces m. By the Dempster combination rule, we have
m(H1) = mm.(1 mH2) /mHl * mH2), and38
m(H2) = mH2(1 mm) / (1min * mH2).
A lengthy but straightforward algebraic exercise starting with these two equations yields
the theorem. End of Proof
Example 4.2.This example illustrates that decomposed bpas by Theorem 4.2 can
indeed be combined to produce the original bpa. Suppose that m(H1) = 0.25 and m(H2)
= 0.375. Applying Theorem 4.2 to m, we have mHl = 0.4 and mH2 = 0.5. As a check,
we combine mHl with mH2 using the Dempster combination rule. This combination
indeed produces m.
Theorem 4.2 tells us that the decomposition is an inverse function of the Dempster
combination rule. Since the Dempster combination rule is commutative, we can combine
any number of decomposed pieces in any order and obtain the unique solution. We will
see later that this property is very important for our combination framework.
Thus, given a bpa m with foci H1 and H2 and a bpa m' with foci H3 and H4, we
can canonically decompose m and m' into simple support functions mHl, MH2, l'H3and
m'H4 using Theorem 4.2. Let the dependence parameters between m and m' be D and
D'. We could estimate dependence parameters among InH1, mH2, M1113 and 111'1-14 as
D13 = Di4 =D23 =D24 =D,
D31 = D41 = D32 = D42 = D', and
Di2 = D21 = D34 = D43 = 0,
where Di, is dependence parameter fromto mit. These estimations are motivated by
the idea that each smaller part of m evenly depends on every part of m' and vice versa.
This seems a natural choice if there is no knowledge about how dependence is distributed
internally between m and m'. Now, the problem of combining two bpas with two
mutually exclusive foci is changed to the problem of combining four simple support39
functions. We will show how to do that in the next chapter.
4.3.Decomposing Odds-likelihood-ratio
Now, let us turn to the decomposition of evidence for the Odds-likelihood-ratio
formulation of Bayes Theory. Let E12 and E23 be two pieces of dependent evidence.
Suppose E2 is the underlying portion of evidential source shared by E12 and E23. Thus,
we can view E12 as a composite of (E1, E2 }, and E23 as {E2, E3 ).According to
Definition 3.1, the dependence parameters between E12 and E23 are defined as
DE12E23= w E2 wE12 and
DE23E12 17-WE2WE23 (4.10)
where wi is the weight of evidence Ei, DEi2E23 is the dependence parameter fromE12 to
E23 and DE23E12 is the dependence parameter from E23 to E 12. The likelihood ratio
XE of a piece of evidence E is related to the weight of E, wE, by
= e wE. (4.11)
Theorem 4.3.Givenlikelihood ratio XE12 and XE23 for E12 and E23, the
decomposition defined bellow is valid. It decomposes XE12 and 423 into 41, XE2, and
43, which are the likelihood ratio of E1, E2, and E3.
* aE2 = XE12,
(ln 2t,E_ )( 2lnXE12)D-P121- P2 3
(4.13)
42 * = XE23 , and
(in A.E2 ) / (In XE23 )= DE231E12.
(4.12)
(4.14)
(4.15)
Proof. From (4.11) and Definition 3.1, we can deduce (4.13) and (4.15).(4.12) and
(4.14) are simply the multiplication rule for independent probabilities. End of Poof40
4.4.Examples
We now present examples that show how to combine dependent evidence using the
approaches described above.In these examples, we use the Dempster rule as the
combination rule of our Decomposition-Combination framework. Example 4.5 and 4.6
illustrate why the dependence among evidence should be taken into account when we
combine evidence. In Chapter 6, we will present a complete example of soybean-disease
diagnosis that uses the Odds-likelihood-ratio formulation of Bayes Theory in the
combination framework.
Example 4.3.Referring to Example 3.1, we again consider two physicians P1 and
P2 who offer diagnoses on a patient. Suppose that P1 collects distinct symptoms si, s2,
s3, and s4. And he concludes that these symptoms support disease d with belief 0.75, so
that mi(d) = 0.75. Suppose that P2 collects distinct symptoms s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, and
sg, and he concludes that these symptoms support disease d with belief 0.6, so that
m2(d) = 0.6. Notice that mi and m2 are not independent of each other, since they share
the symptoms s3 and s4.If we assume that every symptom equally supports the
diagnosis (this assumption could be relaxed if we have medical knowledge to distinguish
between the importance or weights of symptoms), we would compute dependence
parameters D12 = 1/2 and D21 = 1/3. Applying Theorem 4.1 to ml and m2, we obtain
ml 1(d) = 0.5, m12(d) = 0.5, m21(d) = 0.263, and m22(d) = 0.457. The bpas mu 1,
m12, m21, and m22 are supported by four sets of pieces of evidence { si,s2},s3, s4} ,
s3, s4 }, and {s5, s6, s7, 58} respectively. Notice that mi 2 and m21 assigned by
different physicians have different beliefs, even though they are based on the same
symptoms set { s3, s4}. This difference could result from certain factors such as the
differences in the physicians' epistemic or psychological status, or social factors, which41
are simply viewed as noise. Therefore, we could reasonably use the average of mi2 and
m21 as the compromised belief m' that is supported by { s3, szt} . Thus we have m'(d) =
0.381. Now, the three pieces of evidence mil supported by { si, s2), m' supported by
{ s3, 54), and m22 supported by { s5, s6, s7, sg } are independent and can be combined
by the Dempster combination rule. The final result is m(d) = 0.83.
Example 4.4.If we ignore the dependence between mi and m2 in Example 4.3, and
directly combine them by the Dempster combination rule, we would produce m(d) =
0.94. This result greatly overestimates the degree of belief in d.
Example 5.3.Suppose that physician P makes a diagnosis m (d) = 0.45. A few
days later, he repeats the diagnosis when he meets the patient at a supermarket (m2(d) =
0.45). Assuming that no new evidence is used, mi and m2 are completely dependent
upon each other (D12= n21 = 1).Combining mi and m2 by our approach yields a
belief in d that stays the same as the original belief 0.45. On the other hand, if we ignore
the dependence and combine mi and m2 by the Dempster rule, we obtain a degree of
belief 0.7 in d. This is unreasonable, since we should not increase degree of belief by
simply restating the belief. In fact, by repeatedly combining a diagnosis with itself, we
can drive the belief in that diagnosis as close to certainty (m = 1) as we wish. While
repetition is an important tool we use to convince others of the validity of our views, it
should have no impact on the results that are produced by formal or automated reasoning
systems.42
4.5.Property Curves of the Combination Framework
How do dependencies among evidential sources affect the combined degrees of
beliefs? Intuitively, the more strongly the input evidential sources depend upon each
other, the lower the combined beliefs should be.The reason is that stronger
dependencies result from more overlapping of sources and result in less independent
contributions to combined results.This property is best illustrated by curves of
combined degrees of beliefs against dependence parameters of input evidence, as shown
in Figure 8 and Figure 9.
In Figure 8, two pieces of evidence E1 and E2 support the same hypothesis with
different degrees of beliefs. The y-axis denotes the total degrees of beliefs computed by
the combination framework employing the Dempster rule, the x-axis denotes the values
of dependence parameters between the two pieces of input evidence. Each curve
indicates that for each pair of inputs, how the total degree of belief changes along with the
change of dependence. In Figure 9, E1 and E2 support the same hypothesis with the
same degrees of belief. The curves also show that when the values of the dependence
parameter increase, the total degrees of belief decrease.43
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Figure 8. Total degrees of belief decrease when dependence increases.
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Figure 9. Total degrees of belief decrease when dependence increases.44
CHAPTER 5. MERGING AND POOLING DEPENDENT EVIDENCE
In last chapter, we describe the Decomposition-Combination method (DC method)
for combining two bodies of dependent evidence. In this chapter, we show how these
methods can be extended to merge and pool sequences of evidence.In merging
evidence, all pieces in a sequence of evidence are accumulated, and then all are combined
simultaneously. In pooling evidence, as a sequence of evidence is being gathered, each
new piece is accumulatively combined with a single body that is a combination of the
previous pieces. We present algorithms for merging and pooling sequences of evidence.
We describe the advantages and disadvantages of these algorithms. Which one is more
applicable in solving a specific problem should be determined from the particulars of the
problem. These two algorithms use the pairwise-dependence assumption, that is, there is
no more than two pieces of evidence share the same evidential sources. In Chapter Six,
we will show what will happen if the assumption is violated.
5.1.Merging Algorithm
The merging algorithm is a straightforward extension to the DC method described in
the last chapter. While the DC Method deals with two bodies of dependent evidence, the
merging algorithm handles arbitrary number of pieces of evidence. More precisely, given
n bodies of evidence which might depend upon each other in a pairwise fashion, this
algorithm combines them simultaneously to produce a single body of composite
evidence.
When several pieces of evidence are involved, there might be more than two bodies
of evidence that are pairwise dependent. To illustrate, let us go back to Figure 4 in
Chapter 3, in which four pieces of dependent evidence El, E2, E3, and E4 overlap. For45
example, E1 shares a portion of an evidential source with E2, and at the same time,
shares another portion with E4. Following the philosophy of the DC Method, we need to
decompose E1 into three pieces, one shared with E2, one shared with E4, and one
uniquely belonging to El. We call this sort of decomposition 3-way decomposition. We
can readily extend this notion to that of an n-way decomposition. After n-way
decomposing all the evidence, we can combine all the pieces that share the same
evidential source by averaging. The rationale behind the averaging is the same as that of
averaging two pieces, which is described in the last chapter. We can combine all pieces
produced in the averaging step with the pieces that derive from sources that were
originally independent. To illustrate, Let us decompose and combine E1, E2, and E3 in
Figure 4. The combination of Ei, E2, and E3 is shown in Figure 10 on the next page.
For this example, the merging algorithm works as follows. Firstly, E1 is two-way
decomposed into two pieces, E12 shared with E2 and E1' uniquely associated with itself.
E2 is three-way decomposed into three pieces, E21 shared with E1, E23 shared with E3,
and E2' uniquely belonging to E2. Similarly, E3 is two-way decomposed into E32 and
E3'. Then, degrees of belief associated with E12 and E21 are combined into a single
degree of belief, denoted by E(12), by averaging, since these two pieces actually come
from the same evidential source.Similarly, E23 and E32 are combined into E {23}.
Finally, E1', E21, E3', E{ 12 },and E{ 23 } are combined by the Dempster Rule. This
yields the final result E1..3
To do n-way decomposition, we note that an n-way decomposition can be
transformed into n-1 two-way decompositions.For example, the three-way
decomposition of E2 of the above example can first be two-way decomposed into two
pieces E12 and E22, the portion that contains both parts associated with E3 and E2 itself.
And then another two-way decomposition further decomposes E22 into two pieces E2',
the portion uniquely assigned to E2 and E23, the portion shared with E3. This process is
illustrated in Figure 11. In order to perform the second two-way decomposition, we46
must compute the partial dependence parameter D22,3, which can be determined from the
normalized dependence matrix:
D22,3 = (numerator of D2,3) / (denominator of D2,3 - numerator of D2,1).
El El' E3' E3
Figure 10. Combining three bodies of evidence E1, E2, and E3.
To understand the formula, we look into the dependencies among E1, E2, and E3 of
Figure 4. Generally, the partial dependence parameter Dii,J can be computed by
= (numerator of DO divided by (5.1)
(denominator of- all numeratorsof Disk which have been decomposed).
Now, we are ready to proceed to describe the merging algorithm.
Algorithm 5.1. Merging Dependent Evidence.
Input: A sequence of evidence E1, E2,...,En,
and the normalized dependence matrix, DM;
Output: The combined result El..n.
Begin
1. n-way decompose E1, E2,...,En:
For i = 1 To n Do47
Compute the dependence parameters for row i.
Decompose Ei into Eli, E2i, Eli, Eni;
2. Average all pairs of beliefs associated with Eij and Eji (ij) to get E{ij};
3. Combine Ell,...,Enn, and all Euj s
by the Dempster Rule to produce the result EL.n
End.
The portion
shared with El
E12:
the portion
shared by
El and E2
E2
ET:
the portion uniquely
belonging E2
The portion
shared with E3
The first two-way decomposition
E22:
the portion containing both parts
shared with E3 and uniquely
assigned to E2 itself
The second two-way decomposition
E23:
The portion
shared with E3
Figure 11. A three-way decomposition.
This merging algorithm is commutative; that is, the order of processing of the
evidence does not affect the result. First, the order in which the n bodies of evidence are
decomposed does not affect the final result, because the decomposition always produce
the same set of smaller pieces of evidence no matter how these pieces of evidence are
decomposed. Second, averaging, is of course commutative. Finally, Dempster's rule
itself is commutative [Shafer, 1976].Since all three steps of the algorithm are
commutative, the entire algorithm is commutative.
The time complexity of the algorithm depends heavily on the dependence among
inputs. The best case is that all bodies of evidence are independent of each other. Steps 1
and 2 of the algorithm do nothing, since all dependence parameters are zeros. Thus the48
algorithm is reduced to the third step, the normal Dempster's Rule.Thus, n-1
combinations by the Dempster's rule are needed.In the worst case, all bodies of
evidence depend upon each other. If we assume that there are no more than two bodies
of evidence sharing the same evidential source, then the worst case is n*(n-1) two-way
decomposition, n*(n-1)/2 averages, and n+n*(n-1)12 combinations by the Dempster rule.
If we drop the pairwise dependence assumption, this method could be extended to more
general cases, where the maximum number of dependence parameters is 0(2n). This
means that we need exponential numbers of decompositions and combinations.This
complexity is not practical if n is not reasonably small.
5.2. Pooling Algorithm
Suppose that the pieces of evidence are being gathered in the order:
El, E2, Ei, Ei+i,
and suppose we have gathered the first i bodies of evidence and we have combined them
to form a single body, EL.i. Now suppose that we obtain a new piece of evidence
Ei+i, and we want to combine it with ELA to obtain E Clearly, if we know the
dependence parameters between Ei.j. and Ei+i, and Di+1,1..i, we can simply
use the DC Method to combine them.But, how do we determine D and
Di+1,1..1
Suppose that the normalized dependence matrix for the sequence of evidence is
[Dj,kii+1 (5.2)
where Dj,k = wi,k/wi.According to the definition of the dependence parameter,
D1..i,i4.1 should be the fraction whose numerator is the number of weight units of the49
portion of the evidential source shared by E Li and Ei+i, and whose denominator is the
number of weight units of El.d. Therefore, we have
D 1 ..i,i+1 / (wi ++ wij<iciwj,k
Similarly, Di±1, 1.d can be determined by
Di+1,1..i = wi+1
(5.3)
(5.4)
Example 5.1. From the normalized dependence matrix in Example 3.4, we can
compute
D1.2,3
D3,1..2
D1..3,4
D4,1,3
=
=
=
=
(0+4)/(6+8-2) = 4/12 = 1/3,
(0+4)/12 = 4/12 = 1/3,
(1+0+2)/(6+8+12-2-0-4) =
(1+2)/4 = 3/4.
3/20,
By carefully comparing these dependence parameters with Figure 4, we can see the
computations are indeed correct.
Armed with the normalized dependence matrix, the pooling algorithm is simple:
Algorithm 5.2. Pooling Dependence Evidence
Input: ELL Ei+i, and Dependence Matrix of E1,Ei+i, DM,
Output:
Begin
1. Compute Di..i,i+i and Di+1, l..i from DM by formulas (5.3) and (5.4);
2. Combine Ei..i with Ei+i by the DC Method to produce
End.
Example 5.2. (Pooling Dependent Evidence). This simple example illustrates how to
use the Algorithm to accumulatively combine three bodies of evidence. Suppose that we
have the following pieces of knowledge in our knowledge base:
E1 supports Hypothesis H1 with degree of belief 0.3,50
E2 supports Hypothesis H1 with degree of belief 0.7,
E3 supports Hypothesis (NOT H1) with degree of belief 0.2,
And also we have the normalized dependence matrix of Example 3.4 in the knowledge
base. Suppose that at the beginning of the session, we gather two bodies of evidence El
and E2. Following Algorithm 5.2, we first compute D1,2 = 2/6 and D2,1 = 2/8, and then
combine El with E2 by the DC Method. This yields a single body of evidence E1,.2
which supports H1 with degree of belief 0.74. Now, suppose that we obtain the third
body of evidence E3.Again, we first compute Di ..2,3 and D3,1..2 from the
dependence matrix: DE2,3 = 1/3, and D3,1..2 = 1/3. We then combine ELI with E3
by the DC Method. This combination produces the result E1..3 which supports H1 with
belief 0.56, (NOT H1) with 0.06, and the frame of discernment (Hi or NOT H1) with
0.38.
The pooling algorithm is commutative if all beliefs associated with evidence are
consistent. Two bodies of evidence are consistent if the beliefs in the hypothesis
associated with the portion shared by the two are the same. We explain the
commutativity of the pooling algorithm by an example.Figure 12 shows a
decomposition of consistent evidence. The overlapping evidence E1, E2, and E3 can be
decomposed into El', E12, P 21, E23, and E3', five smaller pieces of evidence that are
independent. To combine the original three bodies of evidence is equivalent to the
combination of these five smaller pieces. Notice that in the decomposition, E12 = E21,
and E23 = E32 because the evidence is consistent. Combining the sequence of original
evidence (E1, E2, E3) by the pooling algorithm is equivalent to combining the sequence
of five smaller pieces (El', E12, E2', E23, E3') by the Dempster rule. Suppose the three
pieces of evidence are gathered in a different order, say (E3, E2, El). Combining the
sequence (E3, E2, El) by the pooling algorithm is equivalent to combining the sequence
(E3', E23, E2',E12, El) by Dempster rule. Since the Dempster rule is commutative, the
order in which the five smaller pieces are combined does not affect the final result.51
Therefore, combining (E1, E2, E3) produces the same result as combining (E3, E2, E1).
Figure 12. Decomposing consistent evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence to be combined is not consistently assessed or
computed, the pooling algorithm is not always commutative.
Example 5.3. Suppose that E1, E2 and E3 support hypothesis H with beliefs 0.51,
0.75, and 0.91 respectively. And suppose that D12 n= 21= D23 = D32 =1/2, and D13
= D31 = 0 (E1 and E3 are independent of each other). Here,E 1 is inconsistent with
E2 because belief in E12 is 0.3 while belief in E 21 is 0.5. E2 is also inconsistent
with E 3 becasue belief in E23 is 0.5 while belief in E32 is 0.7.Combining the
sequence (E 1, E2, E3) by the pooling algorithm produces belief 0.952 in H while
combining the sequence (E3, E2, E1) yields belief 0.943 in H. There is a minor
difference of about 0.01. The difference results from the different orders in which the
inconsistent evidence is combined into the result.
The complexity of the pooling algorithm also depends heavily upon the dependencies
among the inputs. In the worst case, in which all bodies of input evidence are pairwise
dependent of each other, to combine ELA with Ei±i by the pooling algorithm requires52
0(n2) additions and subtractions in the first step and one application of the DC Method in
the second step. This is much smaller than that of the merging algorithm because in
pooling, just two pieces of evidence are combined at each call to the algorithm while in
merging, all n pieces of evidence must be combined at once at each call to the algorithm.53
CHAPTER 6. SOYBEAN DISEASE DIAGNOSIS -- AN EXPERIMENT
Our experiment in soybean disease diagnosis is designed to demonstrate the
Decomposition-Combination method for handling dependent evidence is statistically
applicable and works correctly for real problems. The applicability of the approach is
demonstrated by actually extracting statistical information from real data about soybean
diseases, and then applying it to this information to produce diagnosis. The correctness
of the diagnosis is justified by a "gold standard"the diagnosis produced by the
standard probability model.
The experiment includes three parts. The first is to combine two pieces of dependent
evidence, the second is to combine three pieces with pairwise dependence only, and the
third is also to combine three pieces but these pieces all overlap with each other (the
intersection of the three pieces is not empty).
The expeirment results of the first two parts demonstrates that our Decomposition-
Combination method gives the exact same results as the gold standard. The third part of
the experiment shows that if we completely ignore the three-way overlap (the intersection
of the three pieces), the Decomposition-combination method gives results that are a little
higher than the gold standard. However, if we completely ignore all of dependence and
treat the three pieces as independent ones, the Odds-likelihood-ratio formulation gives a
much higher degree of belief than the gold standard.
6.1.Experiment Description
The probability calculus used in the experiment is the Odds-likelihood-ratio
formulation of Bayes Theory. Recall the rule
O(dIS) = Xs * 0(d) (6.1)54
where d is a hypothetic disease, S is a symptom, 0(d) is prior odds, defined as
P(d)/P(d), Xs is a likelihood ratio, defined as P(S1d)/P(SId), and O(dIS) are the
posterior odds. S can be a set of symptoms {Si,...,Sm). If all symptoms in S are
independent of each other, Xs can be determined by
X, ** s =s*s2-.sm.
The underlying probability P can be recovered from odds by the simple formula
P = 0/(0+1). (6.2)
The raw data used in the experiment is a dataset collected for testing machine
learning algorithms.It contains total 307 instances, each of which consists of 35
symptoms and the corresponding soybean disease. The experiment starts with analyzing
the raw data by statistical means. The analysis produces the associations between
symptoms and diseases equipped with likelihood ratio Xs which indicate the strength of
the associations. In particular, the experiment focuses on the three symptoms
Si: stem is abnormal,
s2: canker-lesion is bark, brown, or black,
s3: firm and dry external-decay present, and
and the disease
D: FROG-EYE-LEAF-SPOT.
Thus, the statistics produces three likelihood ratio Xsi, Xs2, and Xs3 indicating how
strongly symptoms si, s2, and s3 support disease D. Assuming the symptoms are
independent of each other, we can use Formula (2.3) to compute the odds
0(dIsi, s2, s3) = Xsl * Xs2 * Xs3 * 0(H), (6.3)
which is the total degree of belief that si, s2, and s3 support D.55
To test the DC method, we artificially construct two composite symptoms S12 =
{si, s2} and S23 = {s2, s3), and then compute likelihood ratio Xs12 and X523 from that
statistical information. Since S12 and S23 are no longer independent of each other,
Formula (6.1) can not be used for computing the posterior odds O(dIS12,S23).
To obtain this posterior odds, we use the DC method to combine the two dependent
symptoms S12 and S23. In the following sections, we explain how thiscombination can
be done. The resulting odds 0(dIS12, S23) should equal to the odds 0(dISi, S2, S3),
the "gold standard", since { S12, S23 } contains exactly same information as { S 1, S2,
S 3 }.
Indeed, the experiment does demonstrate the equality, therefore the DC method does
work correctly for this real world example. The experiment is explained step by step in
the next two sections.
6.2. Extracting Statistical Information
In order to extract statistical information, we built an SQL-based database that
contains the 307 soybean disease instances and used SQL aggregation functions to
compute frequencies. We assume that the 307 instances are uniformlyrandomly chosen,
therefore there is no implied "bias". Thus, the frequencies approximate to probabilities.
The following are the statistical results:
P(d) = P(FROG-EYE-LEAF-SPOT) = 40 / 307,
P(d) = P(Not (FROG-EYE-LEAF-SPOT)) = 267 / 307,
P(s1 I D) = P("stem is abnormal" I FROG-EYE-LEAF-SPOT) = 27 / 40,
P(s1 I d) = P("stem is abnormal" I Not (FROG-EYE-LEAF-SPOT)) = 139 / 267,
P(s2 I D)
= P("canker-lesion is bark, brown, or black" IFROG-EYE-LEAF-SPOT) = 20 / 40,
P(s2 I d)
= P("canker-lesion is bark, brown, or black" I Not (FROG-EYE-LEAF-SPOT))56
= 55 / 267,
P(s3 I D) =
P( "firm and dry external-decay presents" I FROG-EYE-LEAF-SPOT) = 25 / 40,
P(s3 I -d)
= P("firm and dry external-decay presents" I Not (FROG-EYE-LEAF-SPOT))
= 39 / 267.
By formula (6.1) and (6.3), we can compute the posterior
0(dIsi, s2, s3) = 2ts1 * Xs2 * Xs3 * 0(H) = 1.3 * 2.43 * 4.28 * 0.15 = 2.0281.
Converting it to probability by (6.2), we have
P(dIsi, s2, s3) = 0 / (1 + 0) = 2.0281 / (1 + 2.0281) = 0.67 (6.4)
This is my "gold standard".
6.3.Combining Dependent Symptoms
Let S12 = si, s2) and S23 = s2, s3).From statistical information, we compute
the likelihood ratio
X.s12 = 3.16 and Xs23 = 10.4.
Now, how can we compute the posterior odds 0(D I s-12 , S23)? We could use (6.1) to
compute it:
0(dI S12, S23) = 10.4 * 3.16 * 0.15 = 4.93,
P(dI S12, S23) = 0.83.
The result does not match the "gold standard", 0.67. Why? The reason is because
the independence assumption of (6.1) is violated since S12 and S23 are not
independent, they share symptom S2. Now, let us use the DC Method to compute57
the odds.
(1) Compute dependence parameters between S 121)3CLa23.
Using the method described in Chapter Four, we can compute ?.s2 = 2.427. By
(3.2), we have
ws2 = In (2.427) = 0.887,
ws23 =1n (10.4) = 2.342,
'12= ln (3.16) = 1.151.
From the definition of dependence parameters (Definition 3.1), we have
DS23IS12 = W S2/ W523=0.887 /2.342=0.379,
135121523 = W52 w512=0.887 /1.151=0.771.
(2) Decompose Xsi2 ( = 10.4 ) and Xs.22 ( = 3.16).
By Theorem 4.3, we decompose these two likelihood ratio into independent pieces:
Xs2(Xs12)Ds121s23
10.4
0.379
= 2.429,
s3Xsi2.Xs210.4 / 2.429 = 4.28, and
Xsi = Xs23 As2 = 3.16 / 2.429 = 1.3.
(3) Compute 0(D I Si242.31.
By (6.1) and (6.3), we have
0(D I S12, S23) = A,s1 * A,s2 * X,s3 * 0(H) = 1.3 * 2.43 * 4.28 * 0.15 = 2.0281.
The corresponding probability is58
P() I S12, S23) = 0 / (1 + 0 ) = 0.67.
The result exactly matches the "gold standard" (6.4).
6.4.Combining Three Symptoms with Pairwise Dependence
In this section, we examine how the Decomposition-Combination method can be
used to combine three pieces of evidence with pairwise dependence only. The result also
exactly matches the gold standard.
We add a new symptom:
S4 : precip is abnormal.
From staticstical data, we have
P(precip is abnormal I FROG- EYE -LEAF -SPOT)= 40/40, and
P(precip is abnormal I not FROG- EYE - LEAF -SPOT) = 217 / 267.
Thus, the likelihood ratio is Xszt = 1.23. We construct three pieces of pairwise dependent
evidence S12, S23, and S34, and compute, in the same way as above, that
and
s23 = 10.4, andXs34 = 5.26, Asi23.16,
Ds2012 = 0.379, D512s23 = 0.771, D52034 = 0.62, and Ds341s23 = 0.87.
Now, using the Decomposition-Combination method to combine the three pieces St2,
S23, and S34, we have
0(13 I S12, S23, S34) = 2.49 and P(D I S12, S23, S34) = 0.71.59
The result matches the gold standard:
O(dIsl, S2, S3, s4) = Xsi * Xs2 * Xs3 * Xs4 * 0(H) = 2.49 and P(dIs, s2, s3,s4)
= 0.71.
6.5.Combining Three Symptoms with Three-way Overlap
Three pieces of evidence is said to be three-way overlap if they share certain
evidential sources. Recall that our merging and pooling algorithms are designed for
pairwise dependence. An interesting question is what will happen if we use the
algorithms to combine evidence with three-way overlap. In other words, what will
happen if we ignore three-way overlap when using the Decomposition-Combination
method to combine three pieces of eivdence with three-way overlap? The experiment
described in this section is designed to answer this question.
The experiment result shows that the Decomposition-Combination method gives a
little highter degree of belief than the gold standard if the three-way overlap is ignored.
However, if we ignore all of dependence and use the Odds-likelihood-ratio formulation,
we obtain much higher degree of belief than the gold standard.
In this experiment, we use the symptoms si, s2, s3, s4 described in the last section
to construct three pieces of dependent evidence S124 = {si , s2, s4 } , S134 = { s, s3,
s4 } , S234 = { s2, s3, s4 } .Thus, the three pieces share the evidential source s4. From
the last section, we can compute
ks124=3.89, 2 s134 = 6.84, and Xs234 = 12.79.
If we completely ignore the dependence concerning s4, we have, from the last section,
Ds124s134 = 0.19,
= 0.35, DS2346124
D5134E124
Ds1346234
=
=
0.14, Ds124s234
0.76, Ds2346134
=
=
0.65,
0.57.60
Using the Decomposition-Combination method, we have
O(D I S124, S134, 5234) = 3.76 and P(D I S124, S134, 5234) = 0.79.
This is a little higher than the gold standard:
0(dIsi, s2, s3, s4) = 2.49 and P(dIsi, s2, s3, 54) = 0.71.
But, this result is much better than that from independent assumption. If we ignore all of
dependence (treat the three pieces as independence ones) the Odds-likelihood-ratio
formulation gives
O(D I S124, S134, 5234)= AS124 * X5134XS234 0(D)
= 12.79 * 3.89 * 6.84 * 0.15 = 51.05.
The corresponding conditional probability is
P(D I S124, 5134, 5234) = 51.05 / (1+ 51.05) = 0.981.
This result is almost a certainty, which is far away from the gold standard.61
CHAPTER 7. AN AUTOMATIC DECISION MAKER
FOR MULTI-EXPERT SYSTEMS -- A POTENTIAL APPLICATION
During the last two decades, expert system technologies have been making
extraordinarily significant progress. A great deal of research has been made on rule-
based systems, knowledge engineering, expert system shells, and approximate
reasoning. Applications of these technologies, such as medical diagnosis, computer
configuration systems, electronic trouble shooting, financial decision making, crop
disease diagnoses, CAD, and battlefield condition predictions have been built, tested,
and/or used. Expert systems are no longer fictions, but realities. At the same time,
advances in communication technology has provided us with world-wide computer
networks.
Now, it is time to ask whether we could combine expert system technologies with
network techniques to achieve a more ambitious goal - distributed multi-expert systems,
that would be more powerful than single expert systems because more knowledge and
information could be used, and that would be also more powerful than conventional
remote information sharing techniques because not only information would be shared but
knowledge as well.
In this chapter, we propose a model for distributed multi-expert systems which would
help achieve this goal. This model is a potential application of the approach described in
the previous chapters, although it does not include all of the technical details.
7.1. Problem Definition and Description
At the top level, a distributed multi-expert system (DMES) can be viewed as a group
of expert systems which are of the same application domain and are located at differentb2
sites. Each expert system possesses its own knowledge base, data and inference engine,
and it can be viewd as an independent individual.All individuals are networked,
therefore they can communicate with each other. When a question is posted to a DMES,
all its members, using their own data and knowledge, post their own opinions. Then
these opinions, after a conducted consensus procedure of exchanging opinions among
members, are combined into a unique solution to the posted question which takes every
member's opinion into account. Our goal is to build an automatic decision maker for a
DMES, which conducts the consensus and combination procedures and produces the
solution to the question of interest.
Why we should undertake this study, when we already have powerful individual
expert systems that are accessible through networks? We list three of the most important
reasons:
(1) Knowledge sharing. First of all, a DMES could use computer networks in a
revolutionary way -- to help share knowledge while sharing information. Members'
opinions into which an individual's knowledge and information are encoded are shared
by the group. Passing opinions needs much less communications than passing raw,
unprocessed information.
(2) More information available. The sum of the information available to a group is as
least as great as that available to any member in the group. Thus, a solution reached by a
DMES may reflect more aspects of the problem of interest, and may therefore be more
accurate.
(3) More knowledge available. The sum of the knowledge available to a group is as
least as great as that available to any member of the group. If every member in the group
is a real expert in the subject, the total knowledge of the group is probably many times
that possessed by any single member. Therefore, a solution reached by a DMES is likely
to be more plausible.
How should a decision maker of a DMES arrive at a group decision? First, he should63
be able to "reason with uncertainty ", because opinions provided by experts generally
involve certain degrees of uncertainties.Experts often use phrases like "probably true",
"might be", "likely", and "most likely" to qualify their opinions.Since most expert
systems that include reasoning with uncertainty assign numerical values to measures of
uncertainty or to strengths of beliefs, the decision maker should be able to handle these
numeric values with mathematical precision.
In distributed environments, uncertainty handling has another importance. A group
decision without uncertainty may be possible only when complete and exact information
from members is available. This may need a great deal of communications on the DMES.
When information flow among members is limited, uncertainty techniques may reduce
communication efforts and reach an approximate decision [Bhatnagar and Kanal, 1986].
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opinions and reach a composite decision that takes all individual opinions into account.
In the rare situation in which each expert expresses precisely the same opinion as the
others, the decision maker might reasonably accept this opinion as a plausible group
decision. However, if members differ in their backgrounds, methodology, and in the
information they use in reaching their decisions, their opinions may be different from
each other, and reconciliation will be necessary.
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when combining their opinions. While members do not share precisely the same
information and expertise, they often share some of these. For example, they may access
certain data from the same information sources and they might base their opinions at least
partially on this body of information. In cases like this, the opinions of experts are
stochastically dependent upon each other.Morris observed that the degrees of
dependence between experts significantly affect combined results [Morris 1986]. He
claims:
"The issue of nonindependence among experts is critically important....It is the single64
most important issue in practical applications. Yet, it is often ignored in many expert
combination formulas, probably because it is extremely difficult to think about, much less
quantify".
Finally, the decision maker should be able to treat members' opinions differently.
Members differ in levels of expertise. Some members are more expert than the others
because of better training, more experiences, and greater intelligence. Therefore, the
decision maker, when he combines member's opinions, should treat opinions of different
members differently. He should pay most attention to the opinions of the best members.
While the problem of multi-experts has not attracted much attention in Al community,
it has been studied by statisticians for a long time as a critically important issue of
decision making. Various group models and consensus rules have been proposed, e.g.,
see the excellent review of the subject by Genest and Zidek [1986]. Unfortunately, in
spite of their mathematical precision, these approaches can be hardly used for expert
systems developed in AI community, because they use complete probability models and
request complete and precise statistical information which might not be available to our
expert system [Shafer 1986, Shortliffe 1985]. However, their studies do give us some
important lessons, especially those about group models.
The model of a group with a decision maker has been studied extensively, e.g., see
[Winkler 1968, Morris 1977, Winkler 1981, Genest and Zidek 1986]. This model seems
parallel to many real world situations - a project manager conducting a research group, an
individual consulting several analysts before making a personal investment decision, a
patient making a judgement about his case from advice of several physicians and so forth.
We will use the model of a group with a decision maker as our fundamental model of
DMES, but equip it with a new interaction consensus procedure that is more suitable for
our purpose.
Delphi, a group interaction model of dialogue with restricted feedback is intended to
gain advantages of groups while overcoming the disadvantages [Pill, 1971, Martiao65
1983]. For example, it can overcome the group conformity problem that unrestricted
feedback may induce [Genest and Zidek 1986]. And more important for our purpose, the
model needs less communications, and therefore it is inexpensive, since members of the
group need not communicate directly. We will borrow this idea and refine it to form our
model with the hope of gaining the advantages of the model.
7.2. A New Model of DMES
The model we are proposing possesses five major properties. First, communications
among members are minimized. There is no direct communication among individual
members. Raw data and information can not be exchanged among members. Only
opinions need be passed to the decision maker. The consensus procedure, including
exchanging and revising opinions, is performed at the decision maker site. Therefore
communication efforts are greatly reduced.
Second. group "bias" and conformity are avoided. Since members are not allowed to
exchange raw data and information, members might only partially share evidential
sources with each others. Thus, each member stands on the portion of his opinions that
is based on his "private" data and information. Therefore, the conformity of a group
raised by the model of unrestricted feedback is limited, and group "bias" is avoided.
Third. an iterative procedure is used to reach agreements among members on shared
evidential sources. Exchanging opinions only occurs when members induce different
opinions from the same evidential sources. In cases like this, a member's opinion is
revised towards the others. This revision is an iterative process that eventually leads to
an agreement on the shared evidential sources.
Fourth. the model is not tied to a particular uncertainty calculus. The decision maker
can chose any of the uncertainty calculi among Shafer Theory of Evidence [Shafer 1976],
Bayes Theory, and Odds-likelihood-ratio formulation of Bayes, depending on how66
members' opinions are represented. Thus, the model is a general model for DMES,
suitable for wide range of existing expert systems.
Finally, we do not request all members. including the same
hypothesis set.However, we assume that all members' hypothesis sets are compatible
[Shafer, 1976]. When the decision maker posts a question along with focal hypotheses,
each member needs to convert his own hypothesis set to the decision maker's.
Compatibility assumption makes the conversion easier.
Let E be a group of expert systems and H be a set of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive hypotheses with respect to the working domain of the group. In other words,
H is a set of all possible answers to the question of interest. To start the decision making
procedure, the decision maker posts a subset of H, {H1, H2,...,Hm} indicating the foci
of the problem in hand to the group. After receiving the question, every individual expert
system works independently on it, using its own knowledge and evidential sources to
reach an individual opinion [<H1 ,b 1 >,<Hm,bm>) where bi is his numerical
measurement of degree of belief that supports hypothesis Hi. Then each system returns
its opinion to the decision maker. The opinions can be probability distributions or belief
functions. After receiving opinions from all group members, the decision maker starts
the following consensus procedure:
(1) Estimating dependencies among members' opinions. The dependencies are measures
of degrees of how members' evidential sources overlap. They are epresented as the
dependence parameters among members in the group. In some situations, this estimation
is purely subjective, since experts' opinions are sometimes only based on personal
experiences rather than precise information.
(2) Using the dependencies to separate the portion of each member's opinion that is
supported by the member's private evidential sources from the portions that are supported
by the evidential sources shared with other members. This can be achieved by the
decomposition methods described in Chapter Four.67
(3)Conducting a process of exchanging opinions that are based on the same evidential
sources. During the process of exchanging opinions, each member's opinions is revised
towards the other member's. The process is repeated until agreements on the shared
evidential sources are reached. The consensus procedure is illustrated in Figure 13.
(4) Using estimates of weights assigned to members to weight-average members'
opinions.
(5) Using a proper combination rule to combine all weighed-averaged opinions to
produce a consensus solution.
Figure 13 on the next page illustrates the consensus and combination model for a
group of two expert systems.68
El E2
combining if E12* E21 combining of E12*E21
E1, E2:opinions of Expert-1 and Expert-2.
Ell, E22: portions of opinions of Expert-1 and Expert-2, that are based on their "private data".
E12, E21: portions of opinions of Expert-1 and Expert-2, that are based on shared data
E(1,2):
E
compromised opinion from E12 and E21.
solution to the question.
Figure 13. A consensus and combination model for a group of two experts.69
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The non-independence problem in reasoning with uncertainty is theoretically difficult
not only because of the complexity of computational models but also because of the
difficulty of understanding the nature of the dependence, yet it is practically important,
since we can not completely ignore it in practical decision making processes. This work
is not intended to provide a universal solution to problem. Instead, it focuses on the
practical approaches which are based on mathematically verifiable computational models,
as summarized in this chapter.
8.1.Contributions to Knowledge
The following are the main contributions of this work to the non-independence
problem.
(1)This work provides a new model for representing dependencies among
information sources- the dependence parameter. The dependence parameter that is
characterized by weighting the shared evidential sources is conceptually simpler than the
models provided by probability theories (i.e. covariance and correlations). Therefore, it
is easier to understand and easier to use. Yet, it is a formal model in the sense that it is
derivable from probability models.
(2) This work provides a formal solution for Shafer Theory of Evidence to the non-
independence problem. this has not been fully solved before.
(3)This work provides probability family with a new method for handling
dependencies among evidence. This method might be easier to use and readily extended
to the existing probability models for reasoning with uncertainty (i.e.Pearl's Belief
Networks) to handle dependent evidence.70
(4) This work provides a general framework for handling dependent evidence. This
framework is not only for Shafer Theory of Evidence, for Odds-likelihood-ratio
formulation of Bayes Theory, but also for all uncertainty calculi for which the
corresponding decomposition methods exist, such as the Bayes Theory and Mycin's CF
model. Some of these calculi, such as Mycin's CF model have not had a formal solution
to the non-independence problem before. With the framework, these calculi are ready to
be extended to handle dependent information sources.
8.2.Assumptions and Limitations
In order to make the proposed approaches simpler and practically useful, three
assumptions have been made. These assumptions dramatically reduce the complexity of
the problem, yet do not seriouslylimit the applications of the approaches. These
assumptions are the follows.
(1) Positive correlation assumption. The defmition of dependence parameters implies
the positive correlation assumption. Two information sources are positively correlated if
when one of them occurs, the chance that the other occurs becomes higher. The
dependence parameters catch the nature of positive correlations -- if the two share
(explicitly or implicitly) more evidential sources, then when one occurs, the other is
more likely to occur. The definition of dependence parameters does not capture negative
correlations between evidential sources. Two information sources are negatively
correlated if the occurrance of one reduces the likelihood of the occurrance of the other.
The nature of negative correlations is still vague to humans according to psychologists.
They find that humans have very little ability to detect and accesses negative correlations.
They frequently misjudge negative correlations [Genest and Zidek 86]. Besides, the
computation models involving negative correlations appear to be much more difficult.
This may be the reason why Pearl in his famous belief networks also ignores negative71
correlations and employs the positive correlation assumption [Pearl, 1986].
(2) Pairwise dependence assumption. We defined dependence parameters in such a
way that only two evidential sources are involved in each pairwise dependence.
Theoretically, there is no inherent difficulty in extending the definitions to represent
simultaneous dependencies among many evidential sources. But practically there would
be two difficulties with applying this definition if all possible dependencies must be
explicitly represented. First, the number of dependencies is exponential in the number of
sources.Second, it is not clear that humans have the ability to assess and detect such
complex dependencies among a large number of sources. But these two difficulties are
not unique to the proposed approach. For instance, probability theories also have the
same problems [Henrion 86]. In any event, it is apparently not necessary to consider
every possible dependence; fortunately, it is not true that every event directly depends
upon all others in the real world. Therefore we could view the world we are dealing with
as sparsely connected, and extend our definition of dependence parameters without
worrying too much about complexity. For example, we can define the dependence
parameter that represents how much El depends on E2 and E3 as D1,23 = w123 / wl
where w123 is the weight of the evidential source that is shared by El, E2, and E3; and
w1 is the weight of El. With the extended definition, the combination framework
involves more decompositions that decompose original evidence into independent pieces
and more combinations that combine independent pieces into a final result.
On the other hand, the pairwise dependence assumption might not be able to be
removed if dependence parameters must be computed from statistical data. This is
because the computation needs to solve non-linear equation systems for which general
solutions may not exist.However, the assumption is clearly much weaker than
independence assumptions, therefore, is more acceptable than independence
assumptions.
(3) Two foci assumption. The decomposition method for Shafer Theory of Evidence72
described in Chapter Four assumes that a piece of evidence has at most two mutually
exclusive foci (Recall that a focus of evidence is a hypothesis to which the evidence
assigns non zero degree of belief). This assumption makes the decomposition much
simpler and greatly reduces the complexity. Yet, the assumption is practically acceptable
because, as argued by Baldwin [85], it is natural to ask human experts to assess degrees
of beliefs in a hypothesis and in its negation given a piece of evidence. There are in fact
several other systems reasoning with uncertainty that make the same assumption, for
example, see Baldwin [85] and D'Ambrosio [87].
8.3.Suggested Future Work
The research presented in this document has laid a foundation for the further
exploration of reasoning with uncertainty systems that must handle dependent evidential
sources. There are some improvements and extensions that could now be explored with
respect to both theoretical and practical aspects of the subject. This section summarizes
several of these possibilities for future work.
(1) Multi-expert systems. As proposed in Chapter Seven, the research results could
be extended to model automatic decision makers for distributed multi-expert systems.
The major extensions should focus on the decomposition methods and the iterative
consensus procedure specified in Chapter Seven.The two foci assumption of
decomposition methods should be removed, because it seems unreasonable to require
each expert system to give opinions only in two foci. The consensus procedure should
be more carefully investigated, refined and experimentally tested to determine whether the
procedure fits into group models of consensus theories.
(2) Extension to Pearl's belief networks [Pearl 1986]. Because of the conditional
independence assumption, Pearl's belief networks basically are trees, and his belief
propagation algorithm is limited to trees. When the assumption is violated, trees become73
more general graphs, and the propagation algorithm no long works properly. The work
presented in this document provides a possibility for converting a general belief network
into a belief tree such that the propagation algorithm can still be used. The conversion
could be achieved by using the decomposition method described in Chapter Four to
remove some arcs in the networks such that the resulting networks become trees. The
main research focus should seek the extension to the propagation algorithm that would
work properly on the converted trees.
(3) Extension to Shafer's Markov trees [Shenoy and Shafer 86]. Shafer's Markov
tree technique is another important framework for reasoning with uncertainty. Because
this technique uses the Dempster's rule as the evidence combination calculus, it can not
handle dependent evidence.This technique could be extended by using the
Decomposition-Combination approach to handle dependent evidence.74
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